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Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a bankruptcy
court to alter an insolvent corporation's capital structure so that it can
survive as a going concern. Liabilities typically are trimmed down so
that they no longer exceed assets, and the interests of equity holders
may be diluted or perhaps eliminated. These results are achieved
through a process of negotiation and adjudication that is often time
consuming and expensive.
The costs and delay of reorganization have led leading commen-
tators to conclude that the corporate reorganization process is not
economically justified, and to propose alternative schemes that substi-
tute market-based mechanisms for the negotiation and adjudication
process that now prevails under Chapter 11. This Article challenges
this conclusion, and takes the position that these commentators have
not attached sufficient significance to the transaction costs involved in
using the market to raise the capital necessary to reorganize a
corporation's capital structure. The magnitude of these costs can be
estimated from empirical data on underwriting costs that have been
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. I would like to express
gratitude to the following persons for reading an earlier draft of this Article and sharing their
comments with me: M. Thomas Arnold, John D. Ayer, Douglas G. Baird, Dennis E. Bires,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Dale J. Gilsinger, Allen R. Kamp, Lynn M. LoPucki, John C. McCoid,
Ali M.M. Mojdehi, Mark J. Roe, Winona Tanaka, Robert B. Thompson, and Gregory D.
Wozniak.
1. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERI-
ALS ON BANKRUPTCY 965-66 (2d ed. 1990); THOMAS G. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 218-24 (1986) (recommending the sale of a company as a going con-
cern); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127, 145 (1986) (also recommending sale); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to
Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1988) (advocating the distribution of
options to shareholders and junior creditors to purchase shares in the reorganized company);
Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 527 (1983) (determining valuation by selling a portion of the reorganized company's
stock in the market).
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collected by the Securities and Exchange Commission. While the
bankruptcy reorganization process avoids some transaction costs, it
generates other costs of its own. Depending on the relative magnitude
of its costs, the Chapter 11 reorganization process may be more effi-
cient than its alternatives. Hence, the Chapter 11 reorganization pro-
cess can be justified by the burden of transaction costs that would be
incurred if an insolvent corporation were restructured by other means.
This Article begins with a discussion of corporate capital struc-
tures and the problems of corporate governance that arise when a
corporation's liabilities exceed its assets. These problems involve the
conflicts of interest that insolvency may generate between a
corporation's creditors and its shareholders, and the encouragement
that insolvency gives to management to take undue risks on behalf of
the shareholders. Next, it explains how the going concern value of an
insolvent corporation can be greater than its liquidation value, so that
it may be worthwhile to preserve it. This discussion is followed by
an analysis of the reorganization process that focuses on restoration of
a sound capital structure, with an adequate equity cushion as its pri-
mary objective. The restoration of an adequate equity cushion in the
corporation's capital structure is necessary to resolve the conflicts of
interest that insolvency generates. The Article concludes with an anal-
ysis and criticism of the alternatives to reorganization suggested by
the commentators.
II. CORPORATE CAPrrAL STRUCTURES
The capital structure of a corporation is typically divided be-
tween debt and equity. Equity is necessary because the future earn-
ings of a corporation cannot be predicted precisely, and some class of
investors must be assigned the residue of earnings after all expenses
have been paid.2 Debt is not essential, but a corporation normally
incurs some debt to its employees and suppliers in the regular course
of its business operations. In addition, debt is an alternative source of
financing for a corporation, and most corporations maintain substantial
levels of debt.3
2. See I MODEL BUSINEss CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.01 official comment (1989) (stating
that "[s]ection 6.01(b) ensures that there is alwayg in existence one or more classes of
shareholders who share in the ultimate residual interest in the corporation . . ").
3. Between 1937 and 1979, the overall debt-to-asset ratio increased from 53% to 74%
for all United States corporations, and from 26% to 55% for manufacturing corporations.
Robert A. Taggart, Jr., Secular Patterns in the Financing of U.S. Corporations, in CORPO-
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Determining the appropriate mix of debt and equity in corpora-
tions is an important problem that has occupied financial economists
for many years.' Early writers observed that the use of debt provides
leverage for shareholders, giving them a higher expected return while
simultaneously increasing their risk.' Consider, for example, an in-
vestment that has a 50/50 probability of returning either $50000 or
$150,000, "so that the expected return is $100,000. If $1,000,000 of
capital is needed for this investment and this capital is provided en-
tirely by equity, then the investment would yield an expected rate of
return of ten percent. The expected rate of return for equity holders
would increase substantially if $900,000 of the capital came from
debt paying nine percent interest, and the remaining $100,000 came
from equity. The expected return for equity would then be $19,000
(obtained by subtracting interest to debt holders of $81,000 from the
expected return before interest of $100,000), and the expected rate of
return for the $100,000 of equity would be nineteen percent. With the
introduction of debt, the expected rate of return for equity has nearly
doubled. At the same time, the riskiness of the equity investment has
increased dramatically because the expected return, after interest pay-
ments of $19,000, is the average of a 50/50 probability of either a
$31,000 loss,6 or a $69,000 profit7 on the $100,000 equity invest-
ment. The use of debt for capital financing both dramatically im-
proves the rate of return for shareholders' and exposes their invest-
RATE CAPITAL STRUCTURES IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 16-17 03. Friedman ed. 1985); see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web,
in JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. Er AL., KNIGHTS, RADERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE
HOSTILE TAKEOVER 77, 92-93 (1988) (noting that the trend of increasing debt-to-asset ratios
continued through the first half of 1985).
4. VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARVIN A. CHRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 372 (3d ed. 1987) (commenting that "[o]ne of the most widely debated issues
in financial theory continues to be whether the value of the corporate enterprise can be en-
hanced by a judicious use of leverage, i.e., by financing corporate investments with senior
securities as well as common shares."); Michael Bradley et al., On the Existence of an
Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence, 39 J. FIN. 857, 857 (1984) (observing that
"[o]ne of the most contentious issues in the theory of finance during the past quarter century
has been the theory of capital structure.-).
5. See, e.g., the classic text on financial analysis, BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL, SECURI-
TY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 539-50 (4th ed. 1962).
6. Obtained by subtracting interest of $81,000 from a return of $50,000.
7. Obtained by subtracting interest of $81,000 from a return of $150,000.
8. In quantitative terms, the change in the expected rate of return for equity when debt
is issued is equal to the difference between the expected rate of return without equity and
the interest rate on the debt, multiplied by the ratio of debt to equity. See Franco Modigliani
& Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,
1991]
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ment to increased risk.
The increased risk resulting from leverage yields a number of
costs contributing to the possibility that the corporation will be unable
to service its debt, thereby leading to a bankruptcy proceeding or
other disruption of its activities. The most obvious of these costs are
the legal and accounting expenses involved in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, as well as reduced revenues and increased expenses from opera-
tions. What may be of greater significance, however, are the potential
conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt-holders that are
produced by leverage and that give rise to agency and monitoring
costs. Shareholders receive the rewards if the corporation succeeds,
but they are protected by the limited liability rule if it fails.9 On the
other hand, debt-holders can receive no more than the stated rate of
interest if the business succeeds, but stand to lose the principal
amount of the debt owed to them if it fails. Even in cases where the
taking of risks will not likely benefit the corporation as a whole, it
may benefit shareholders at the expense of debt-holders because
shareholders have everything to gain from risk-taking and only the
value of their shares to lose."°
Accordingly, the use of debt for financing can produce agency
48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 271 (1958) (stating that "ft]he expected yield of a share of stock is
equal to the appropriate capitalization rate . . .for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a
premium related to financial risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread between
[the capitalization rate] and [the rate of interest].") (emphasis in original).
9. Thorough discussions of the limited liability rule can be found in Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Cm. L. REv.
89 (1985); Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporate Law,
30 U. TORONTO L.. 117 (1980).
10. Michael C. Jensen & William F. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334 (1976) (stating that
"[w]ith [a highly leveraged] financial structure the owner-manager will have a strong incentive
to engage in activities (investments) which promise very high payoffs if successful even if
they have a very low probability of success. If they turn out well, he captures most of the
gains, if they turn out badly, the creditors bear most of the costs."); see also Merton H.
Miller, The Wealth Transfers of Bankruptcy: Some Illustrative Examples, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 39, 40. Professor Miller states that:
[w]ith a levered firm, if the stockholders can somehow manage to increase the
riskiness of the firm, they increase the value of their equity interest. If their gam-
ble succeeds-the value of the firm rises to its newly raised potential high-the
stockholders can ...pocket their winnings. If the risky venture fails-the value of
the firm falls to its newly lowered potential low-the stockholders invoke their
limited liability, walk away from the business, and leave the creditors holding the
bag and whatever happens to be left in it.
l Cf Roe, supra note 1, at 549 (stating that "[r]isky debt creates a conflict of interest
between the debtholders and shareholders that encourages unnecessary high-risk strategies.").
[Vol. 20:117
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costs in the form of incentives for taking excessive risks. To the
extent that management is acting for the benefit of the shareholders,
it will embark on riskier projects when a corporation is highly lever-
aged than it would if the corporation had no debt. To protect their
interests, debt-holders might seek provisions in their debt instruments
that place constraints on the level of debt or the riskiness of the pro-
jects that management may undertake." However, there are moni-
toring costs associated with the negotiation and enforcement of these
provisions.12 The debt-holders will seek to pass all of the costs asso-
ciated with leverage (bankruptcy costs, agency costs resulting from
the additional risk caused by management's incentive to undertake
riskier projects, and monitoring costs) along to the corporation and its
shareholders by charging higher interest rates. 3
Thus, while corporate leverage tends to improve the expected
return to shareholders, leverage may be counterproductive if carried
so far that it causes the cost of debt financing to rise. However, the
costs associated with debt financing may be minimized if there is
sufficient equity to act as a "cushion" to absorb the bulk of the risk
to the debt-holders. The presence of an equity account affords protec-
tion to debt-holders because they are entitled to payment ahead of
shareholders. 4 The size of the equity cushion that is needed depends
on the volatility of the corporation's expected earnings.' s As long as
11. See Miller, supra note 10, at 40 (noting that "[c]reditors, of course, are thoroughly
aware of these and related temptations for the shareholders, and they take steps-mainly in
the form of restrictive covenants and surveillance-to protect themselves from risk-increasing
changes in the nature of a firm after their original bargain with it has been struck.").
12. Since monitoring costs will be passed on to the corporation, corporate management
may attempt to reduce them by agreeing to provide detailed reports to the debt-holders and
to have these reports examined by an independent outside auditor. This will generate bonding
costs, which are borne directly by the corporation. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at
338-39.
13. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 334-39.
14. See I MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 6A0 (1989) (noting that distributions to
shareholders are not allowed if this would make the corporation's total assets less than its
total liabilities plus any amount needed to satisfy preferential claims of preferred sharehold-
ers).
15. A strong correlation between the volatility of a firm's earnings and the size of its
equity cushion was demonstrated empirically in Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 873-74 (stat-
ing that "[tihe data reported . . . indicate that our measure of firm volatility is significant
and negatively related to firm leverage ratios across the 821 firms in the sample. The
f-statistic is -12.33."); see also Nevins D. Baxter, Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of
Capital, 22 J. FIN. 395, 402 (1967). Professor Baxter noted that:
since businesses with relatively stable income streams (such as utilities) are less
subject to the possibility of ruin, they may find it desirable to rely relatively
heavily on debt financing. Finns with risky income streams, on the other hand, are
1991]
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there is a sufficient equity cushion so that the likelihood of the
corporation's failing to make debt payments as they become due is
remote, the expected costs associated with bankruptcy and other dis-
ruptions of the corporation's activities on account of insolvency will
be small.'6 Similarly, if there is a sufficient equity cushion, manage-
ment will not have the incentive to take excessive risks because the
risk of failure will be borne by shareholders more than by debt-hold-
ers. Finally, the need for additional monitoring by the debt-holders is
removed if management's incentives for excessive risk-taking are
eliminated. By neutralizing a potential conflict of interest between
shareholders and debt-holders, an equity cushion lowers the various
costs associated with debt financing. Corporate management can then
seek to further the joint interests of shareholders and debt-holders by
operating the corporation to maximize its value.
The optimal size of an equity cushion is affected by a number of
factors and probably can never be determined exactly. In addition to
the volatility of the corporation's expected earnings and the expected
costs associated with bankruptcy (which are difficult to forecast), the
optimal size of the equity cushion would appear to be affected by tax
rates, 7 as well as by other variables." Perhaps the most that can
less able to assume fixed charges in the form of debt interest and may well find
that the average cost of capital begins to increase with leverage even when reliance
on debt is moderate.
Id.
16. See Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. FIN. 575, 581 (1984)
(stating that "[s]ince costs of financial distress are caused by threatened or actual default, safe
firms ought to be able to borrow more before expected costs of financial distress offset the
tax advantages of borrowing.").
17. See Roger H. Gordon & Burton G. Malkiel, Corporation Finance, in How TAXES
AFFECr ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 131 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman ed. 1981); Harry DeAngelo &
Ronald W. Masulis, Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation, 8 3.
FIN. ECON. 3 (1980). But see Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 L FIN. 261, 262 (1977)
(observing that "even in a world in which interest payments are fully deductible in computing
corporate income taxes, the value of the firm, in equilibrium will still be independent of its
capital structure.").
18. See WII.IAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 315-24 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing the effects on a firm's optimal capital structure of
problems associated with the monitoring of management, management's preference for inter-
nally generated funds, and asymmetric information possessed by management); Stephen A.
Ross, The Deternination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signaling Approach, 8 BELL 3.
ECON. 23 (1977) (explaining that increasing debt increases the market's perception of firm
value); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 3. LEGAL STUD. 209, 227 (1989)
(explaining that asymmetric information possessed by management causes debt financing to be
preferred over equity); Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance,
43 J. FIN. 567, 580-81, 589 (1988) (observing that transaction costs for debt financing are
[Vol. 20:117
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be said with much assurance is that there is a range of debt-to-equity
ratios that produce a capital structure with an equity cushion of the
.appropriate magnitude to hold in check the costs associated with le-
verage, while at the same time taking advantage of the lower cost of
debt. Even though one may never be able to specify the optimal debt-
to-equity ratio with precision, it is clear that an equity cushion serves
an important role in maintaining the financial stability of a corpora-
tion. The next section of this Article will examine the problems that
arise when a corporation no longer has an equity cushion.
III. PROBLEMS INTRODUCED BY INSOLVENCY
A corporation generally needs to have a positive equity account
in order to have access to credit. As long as the value of the
corporation's assets exceeds its liabilities, it is realistic to expect that
lenders, who will provide the cash that the corporation needs for its
operations, can be found.'9 As is illustrated in Figure 1, a loan will
create an additional liability, but will also provide cash, which may
be used to pay the current debts. Once the cash from the loan is used
to pay the current debts, the loan will be substituted for them on the
corporation's balance sheet.2"
In contrast, a corporation whose liabilities exceed the value of its
assets faces serious financial problems. Intense conflicts of interest
among management, shareholders, and creditors are generated in this
situation. The insufficiency of assets to satisfy all claims gives rise to
a race among the creditors to seek immediate payment before the
limited fund is exhausted. Each creditor has an incentive to enforce
its claim by seizing one or more of the corporation's assets, even
though this may disrupt the corporation's business activities. At the
same time, the corporation finds it difficult to borrow to pay its
less than for equity, except where firm assets are firm-specific and cannot be redeployed
easily).
19. It may happen that unpaid creditors will disrupt the corporation's business activities
by seizing its assets while a lender is being located. To avoid this, the corporation might file
a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding to gain the benefit of an automatic stay pursuant to
11 U.S.C. section 362 (1988). However, finding a lender is likely to be much easier and
cheaper than filing a reorganization proceeding.
20. See William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of
the State, 41 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 13, 33 (contending that "[i]f [a]
firn has a present value which exceeds the sum of the claims held by creditors, it should










debts because there is no equity cushion to which lenders can look
for security. Although it is possible that some lenders would extend
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credit in return for security interests against particular corporate as-
sets, this would provide only temporary relief, and eventually the
creditors would again seek liquidation to satisfy their claims.
A possible disadvantage to liquidation is that the price obtained
for the corporation's assets, if sold piecemeal, might be less than their
value if kept together within the corporation. Where the liquidation
value of the corporation's assets is less than their going concern val-
ue, liquidation causes a loss for the creditors as a group. This is illus-
trated in Figure 2. Nevertheless, individual creditors may be driven to
pursue liquidation so that they can be paid ahead of other creditors.
While the creditors are threatening to liquidate, the shareholders
and management have other motivations. If a corporation is insolvent
in the sense that its liabilities exceed the value of its assets, share-
holders have nothing to gain from liquidation, and they will want to
see the corporation's operations continue as long as there is any
chance that it will become solvent in the future.21 In the absence of
an equity cushion, shareholders have nothing to lose if the corporation
experiences further losses; the creditors, rather than the shareholders,
bear the downside risk.' In addition, the shareholders will not be
interested in merely moderate gains because until the negative balance
in the equity account is made up, any gains will benefit the creditors
instead of the shareholders.23 Shareholders will therefore tend to fa-
vor projects that offer even a small possibility of large enough returns
to restore a positive balance to their equity account over ones that
promise only moderate gains.24 The effect of the corporation's undertaking
21. Jeremy I. Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELL J. ECON.
437, 439 (1978) (stating that "[s]ince the equity holders are the residual claimants, they
always seek to avoid bankruptcy."); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems
Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? (Second Installment), 57 AM. BANKR.
LJ. 247, 259 (1983) (explaining that "[t]he owners ... often have no economic incentive to
cease operation of even the nonviable business. They seldom will receive anything upon
liquidation."); Michelle 1. white, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other
Priority Rules, 11 BELL J. ECON. 550, 553 (1980) (observing that "equity holders always
favor continuance, since their interest disappears under liquidation . . ").
22. Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Reme-
dies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WlS. L. REv. 311, 328 (noting that "an insolvent business
operates not at the risk of the owner, but at the risk of its creditors.").
23. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 404 (1983) (stating that "[w]hen the firm is in distress, the shareholders' residual
claim goes under water, and they lose the appropriate incentives.").
24. Professor LoPucki makes this point as follows:
Mhe debtor is motivated in the direction of high risk investment. Normal returns
may be insufficient to pay his creditors, leaving no possibility of personal gain to
the debtor from normal operations. The high risk investment, regardless of its
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that there wilt be something remaining for the debtor.
LoPuci, supra note 22, at 321-22.
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downside risk, while an upside gain large enough to overcome the
negative equity balance will accrue to the benefit of the sharehold-
ers.2Y In other words, when a corporation is insolvent, the sharehold-
ers are in the position of being able to speculate with the creditors'
money.26 Accordingly,, shareholders will favor high risk projects, re-
gardless of whether they provide the maximum expected return on the
corporation's assets.27
The conflicts of interest between its creditors and shareholders
produce a crisis for the insolvent corporation. Unless the corporation's
dysfunctional capital structure can be repaired either through the
bankruptcy reorganization process or otherwise, the corporation will
have to be liquidated.
25. See RONALD W. MASULIs, THE DEBT/EQuITY CHOICE 35-36 (1988). Masulis
explains that:
stockholders gain when the risk of firm assets is raised unexpectedly, even though
the value of the finn's assets may fall. This result can occur because the risk
increase causes a shift in wealth from bondholders to stockholders that more than
offsets the effect of a fall in firm value on the stockholders. Thus, maximizing
stockholders' wealth is not always equivalent to maximizing firm value, and if
stockholders control the firm, the former objective is likely to be followed at the
expense of the latter.
Id. (footnote omitted); Devra L. Golbe, The Effects of Imminent Bankruptcy on Stockholder
Risk Preferences and Behavior, 12 BELL J. EcoN. 321, 326 (1981) (noting that "[i]ncreased
variance in returns to the firm does not increase the riskiness of equity holders' returns
because the equity holders* wealth is already guaranteed to be zero should bankruptcy occur.
Instead, increased variance in the firm's returns increases only the upper tail of the distribu-
tion of shareholders' returns."); LoPucki, supra note 22, at 336 (noting that "[b]y risking loss
and creating a concomitant possibility of gain, the owners of the enterprise can indirectly
transfer values to themselves."); Miller, supra note 10, at 40-41. Professor Miller observed
that:
[c]ourt protection that permits stockholders to work their way out of difficulties
and repay their obligations in full ... gives the stockholders a valuable call op-
tion at the expense of the creditors, who in effect are compelled to put up the
OPM [Other People's Money] on terms they would otherwise never accept.
Idl
26. Professor Miller offers the following comments:
Gambling with other people's money would indeed be an artistic way of
making a living, if only one could find the other people to supply the bankroll at
the riskless rate of interest. In general one can't. But if a corporation, is close to
default, and it can get court protection from foreclosure, it may have a close
equivalent.
Miller, supra note 10, at 40 (emphasis in original).
27. "Once a firm is insolvent, shareholders at best have little incentive to monitor the
firm and at worst have an incentive to encourage the firm to engage in risky projects."
Baird, supra note 1, at 131.
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IV. GOING CONCERN VERSUS LIQUIDATION VALUE
In many circumstances, a prompt liquidation will be the best
course because the corporation is not worth saving.28 The corpora-
tion may be providing goods or services subject to declining demand.
Perhaps rising costs for labor or materials are making it uneconomical
to continue operations. The corporation may be unable to keep up
with new technology, foreign or domestic competition, or a changing
regulatory environment. In some cases, management or employees are
incompetent or dishonest.29 The very fact of insolvency is a reason-
ably good indicator that the corporation's business operations are
fundamentally unsound, and if that is so, a reorganized capital struc-
ture will not solve the corporation's financial problems. Instead, the
corporation's assets should be redeployed to another enterprise that
can make more productive use of them."
28. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the
Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CI. L. REV. 738, 741 (1988) [hereinafter Bar-
gaining After the Fall]. Professor Baird and Dean Jackson argue that:
[s]ome firms that cannot meet their obligations are not worth keeping intact as
going concerns. These are the manufacturers that sell computers no one will buy
and the restaurants that serve food no one will eat. The firm's assets are worth
more sold piece by piece than as a unit.
Id; see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors In Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 102 (1984) [hereinafter Adequate Protection
of Secured Creditors] (stating that "[a] principal characteristic of a market economy is, after
all, that some firms fail, and postponing the inevitable or keeping marginal firms alive may
do more harm than good."); William L. Cary, Liquidation of Corporations in Bankruptcy
Reorganization, 60 HARV. L. REV. 173, 194 (1946). Professor Cary stated that:
[r]ehabilitation of the debtor, though it may be possible, is not always the best
solution, either for the creditors and security holders or for the economy as a
whole. As an extreme illustration, the debt structure of a wagon concern in 1910
might be so drastically reduced that, although it could continue operating for a
while longer, the net result would probably be the dissipation of its remaining
capital.
Id, at 194; E. Han Kim & John D. Schatzberg, Voluntary Liquidations: Causes and Conse-
quences, 5 MIDLAND CORP. FIR. J., Winter 1988, at 30 (noting that "[s]ome companies,
perhaps more than you might suspect, are worth more dead than alive. In our recent study of
voluntary corporate liquidations, we find that when a firm voluntarily liquidates, the value of
its stock increases by an average of 34 percent.") (footnote omitted).
29. See Ismael G. Dambolena & Sarkis 3. Khoury, Ratio Stability and Corporate
Failure, 35 3. FIN. 1017, 1017-19 (1980) (listing the major causes of corporate failure).
30. Professor LoPucki made the following observations in his empirical study of Chapter
11 cases filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri during the first
year after the Bankruptcy Code went into effect:
This study disclosed that the large majority of debtors who filed under
chapter 11 did so because their business was about to be liquidated by creditors
[Vol. 20: 117
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There are situations, however, in which an insolvent corporation
is worth saving. Even though the company is insolvent, there may be
a substantial demand for the goods and services that it produces, and
it may have a successful business operation and an efficient organiza-
tion." Its insolvency may have been caused by an unusual event
that is unlikely to recur or by a particular problem that has been
permanently corrected.32 An example is the case of Texaco after
Pennzoil obtained a verdict in excess of $10 billion against it. The
market value of Texaco's stock before Pennzoil's suit was filed was
about $8.5 billion,33 and so the Pennzoil verdict rendered Texaco
insolvent. Nevertheless, Texaco's insolvency did not reflect on the
quality of its business operations or on its viability as a firm. The
extraordinary series of events that led to the Pennzoil suit were un-
likely to recur, particularly to Texaco. Thus, Texaco's insolvency did
not necessitate a liquidation of its assets, and the dissolution of its
organization. Instead, a reorganization of Texaco's capital structure
was called for, which was accomplished by Texaco's filing a Chapter
11 proceeding and eventually settling Pennzoil's claim for $3 bil-
lion.34 Manville and A.H. Robbins are probably other examples of
insolvent companies that were worth saving.35
under non-bankruptcy law. It also disclosed that the large majority of these busi-
nesses fail either during or shortly after the chapter 11 proceedings. Together these
two facts suggest that continued operation of many of these businesses during the
chapter 11 proceeding was ill-advised and that the bankruptcy court, either directly
or at the prompting of the creditors' committee, should have put a stop to them.
LoPucki, supra note 21, at 258-59 (footnote omitted).
31. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 377-78 (3d ed. 1986)
(explaining that "[a] firm can be at once insolvent and economically viable."); JACKSON,
supra note 1, at 209-10 (stating that "[t]he fact that a business may have liabilities in excess
of assets itself says nothing about whether the assets should be doing what they are doing or
something else.").
32. See Baird & Jackson, Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors, supra note 28, at
119 n.69 (pointing out that "[a] firm's liabilities could, for example, exceed its assets because
of torts the firm committed in the past when it was engaged in selling a different kind of
product. Whenever a firm is insolvent, defaults are inevitable, even if the firm has value as a
going concern.").
33. David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and
Financial Distress: Evidence From the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON., Sum-
mer 1988, at 157, 160.
34. See In re Texaco Inc., 84 B.R. 893, 902 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the
"settlement will avoid the risk of having to satisfy the full amount of Pennzoil's judgment,
which now exceeds $11.259 billion, inclusive of interest. If Texaco were required to satisfy
this judgment in full its shareholders will likely have their interests completely eliminated.").
35. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 210. Jackson argues that:
In the case of Manville, for example, it is entirely possible that the current use of
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The justification that is usually given for choosing reorganization
of an insolvent corporation instead of liquidation is that its value as a
going concern is greater than its value if sold piecemeal.36 An alter-
native statement is that the insolvent corporation's revenues are higher
than its variable costs. 37 What may cause a corporation's going con-
cern value to be greater than its liquidation value, or its revenues to
be higher than its variable costs, is the presence of asset specificity;
that is to say, some of its assets have a greater value when owned by
that particular corporation than when owned by another.38 Asset
specificity within a firm may arise from the geographic proximity of
its assets to a particular location, the transaction costs involved in
its assets (as a construction supply company) is the best use of those assets, and
that it would be worth assembling them for that purpose if Manville did not al-
ready exist. It is not inconsistent with that observation to further note that Manville
may in fact be insolvent because of torts committed in its past.
Id
36. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6179 (stating that "[t]he premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are
used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than
those same assets sold for scrap."); Bebehuk, supra note 1, at 776 (noting that "reorganiza-
tion is thought to be especially valuable when (i) the company's assets are worth much more
as a going concern than if sold piecemeal, and (ii) there are few or even no outside buyers
with both accurate information about the company and sufficient resources to acquire it.");
Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1252
(1981) (explaining that "[w]henever the going-concern value of an insolvent debtor's business
exceeds its piecemeal liquidation value, and the receivership preserves that excess value, there
is a net gain for creditors and society.").
37. See POSNER, supra note 31, at 377-78. Judge Posner explained:
If the demand for the firm's product (or products) has declined unexpectedly, the
firm may find that its revenues do not cover its total costs, including fixed costs
of debt. But they may exceed its variable costs, in which event it ought not be
liquidated yet. And maybe in the long run the firm could continue in business
indefinitely with a smaller plant.
Ild; LoPucki, supra note 22, at 327 (noting that "[ciontinued operation will be economically
desirable so long as the present value of the future excess of revenues over expenses other
than interest on debt already incurred and depreciation on assets already owned exceeds the
resale value of the assets.") (emphasis in original); George F. Nichols, A Rationale of Corpo-
rate Reorganization, 9 J. Bus. U. CHi. 77, 90 (1936). Professor Nichols stated:
The immediacy of dissolution will of course depend on the most profitable method
of liquidation. If the concern is able in its present state of technical efficiency to
earn part of its depreciation, the best method would obviously be to continue to
operate until its technical efficiency is so reduced for lack of maintenance that it
cannot earn its direct costs. If it cannot earn its direct costs, nothing remains but
to salvage or dismantle.
Id.
38. See generally Michael H. Riordan & Oliver E. Williamson, Asset Specificity and
Economic Organization, 3 INT'L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 365 (1985) (discussing the effects of
asset specificity on production and transaction costs and the organization of firms).
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assembling and making custom'modifications to the assets, the spe-
cialized training and experience of its employees, the development of
its organizational structure, and other sources. 9
A railroad is a nice example of a firm that is likely to have a
greater, value as a going concern than in liquidation because of a high
degree of asset specificity. A length of track has much less value
when it is not incorporated into a railroad network. During the nine-
teenth century, railroad companies incurred enormous debt in assem-
bling the great railroad networks in order to take advantage of the
potential for long haul and high density traffic. When some of the
railroads failed to generate enough revenue to service their debt, it
became necessary to find a way to preserve their huge networks so
that they could continue to operate.40 The means devised by creative
attorneys was the equity receivership,4 which was the forerunner of
the business reorganization proceeding in Chapter 11 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code.42
Another asset that might be of substantially greater value as part
of a going concern than as part of a corporation in liquidation is the
net operating loss carryover under the federal income tax law.43 The
39. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes,
19 . ECON. LIrERATURE 1537, 1546 (1981) (listing the following ways in which asset
specificity may arise: site specificity; physical asset specificity; and human asset specificity).
40. Arthur H. Dean, A Review of the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 26 CORNELL
L.Q. 537, 537 (1941) (observing that "[i]n the middle of the last century it became obvious
that some method had to be found in order to enable the newly built, but debt-laden, rail-
roads to carry on and yet to relieve them in their inability to meet their debts as they
matured."); Jeffrey Stem, Note, Failed Markets and Failed Solutions: The Unwitting Formula-
tion of the Corporate Reorganization Technique, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 783, 784 (1990) (point-
ing out that "[r]ailroads had enormous fixed assets; they could be wound up and their assets
distributed only with a very substantial loss of value. In addition, these entities provided
services vital to the community. They could not be sold piecemeal without disastrous social
consequences.").
41. See John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 963,
969-70 (1989) (observing that "[the equity receivership ... is bound up with the building
of the railroads."); Alfred N. Heuston, Corporate Reorganizations Under the Chandler Act, 38
CoLum. L. REv. 1199, 1199 (1938) (stating that "[t]he federal equity receivership developed
because of the necessity for continued operation of railroad and public utility properties
pending the adjustment of difficulties with creditors."); Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of
Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 901 (1927)
(observing that "it has been in [the reorganization of railroads] that the law affecting corpo-
rate reorganizations, and particularly the law affecting reorganization through judicial proceed-
ings, has been developed.").
42. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 1, at 959-60 (noting that "many of the features of
Chapter 11 (from its creditor committees to the reorganization plan itself) grew out of the
equity receivership.").
43. See, e.g., In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 928 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir.) (holding that a
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net operating loss carryover in the Internal Revenue Code" was in-
troduced to mitigate the artificiality of the annual accounting system
by permitting a taxpayer with fluctuating earnings to offset losses
from one year against profits from another. The net operating loss
carryover thus operates as a kind of income averaging mechanism so
that a taxpayer with alternating years of losses and profits does not
pay substantially higher taxes than a taxpayer with a more stable in-
come.45 Over the years, taxpayers have devised a variety of schemes
for transferring the net operating loss deduction so that it can be used
to average income between different taxpayers, rather than between
different tax years of one taxpayer. Congress and the courts have
reacted by erecting a number of barriers to corporate taxpayers' traf-
ficking in net operating loss deductions.46 Under Internal Revenue
Code ("I.R.C.") section 381, 47 net operating loss carryovers are al-
lowed for various types of corporate liquidations and reorganizations,
but under I.R.C. section 382,48 net operating loss carryovers are not
allowed for corporate acquisitions in which there is a change of more
than fifty percentage points in the ownership of the acquired
net operating carryover is property of the bankruptcy estate), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 82
(1991); see also Michelle 3. White, The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision, J. EcoN. PERSP.,
Spring 1989, at 129, 144. Professor White explained:
[F]inns that reorganize retain most of their accrued tax loss carryforwards, which
would be lost if they liquidated. These loss carryforwards shelter the firm from
having to pay corporate profits taxes for a period, even if their operations start to
be profitable. They make reorganization attractive relative to liquidation, but do not
affect the choice between reorganization and remaining out of bankruptcy.
Id.
44. I.R.C. § 172 (1988). Taxpayers may carry net operating loss deductions back three
years and forward fifteen years. Id. § 172(b).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Foster Lumber Co., Inc., 429 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1976). The
Court held that:
[a]meliorating the timing consequences of the annual accounting period makes it
possible for shareholders in companies with fluctuating as opposed to stable in-
comes to receive more nearly equal tax treatment . . . . Congress also sought
through allowance of loss carryovers to stimulate enterprise and investment, particu-
larly in new businesses or risky ventures where early losses can be carried forward
to future more prosperous years.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Todd v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 246, 250-51 (1981) (review-
ing the congressional policy underlying the enactment of the net operating loss provisions),
afrd, 682 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1982); MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 251 (3d ed. 1988).
46. See BORIS I. BITrKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 16.20 (5th ed. 1987); C. RICHARD MCQUEEN & JACK
CRESTOL, FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY § 5.01 (1990).
47. I.R.C. § 381 (1988).
48. I.R.C. § 382 (1988).
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corporation's stock.49 The effect of these provisions is to make an
insolvent corporation's net operating loss carryover a highly
firm-specific asset; it will vanish if it becomes separated from the
corporation. Goodwill is another example of an asset with a high
degree of firm specificity, but the value of the goodwill of an insol-
vent corporation is likely to be less than the value of its net operating
loss carryover.
Despite these examples, most assets are probably not highly
firm-specific, and so, most insolvent corporations will not have sub-
stantially greater going concern than liquidation values and, conse-
quently, will not be good candidates for an effective reorganiza-
tion.50 A bankruptcy court that is called upon to determine whether
a reorganization should be allowed to proceed51 should start by at-
tempting to identify those particular assets that have a greater going
concern than liquidation value. Generally, unless the corporation has
substantial amounts of firm-specific assets, there is nothing that a
reorganization can accomplish and, thus, liquidation should be or-
dered. Alternatively, a bankruptcy court should allow a reorganization
to proceed if the debtor can convince the court that, despite insolven-
cy, it still has a viable business. In most instances, it is reasonable to
infer from the fact of insolvency that the debtor is unfit to carry on
its business; however, this inference may be overcome if the insolven-
cy was caused by an unusual event or a particular problem that has
been corrected. If the debtor is not able to furnish the court with
such an explanation, however, the reorganization generally should not
be allowed to go forward.
V. REPAIRING THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
If a reorganization is allowed to go forward, its central objective
should be to repair the debtor's dysfunctional capital structure.52 This
49. See B1TTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 46, at 16-1 to 16-101; JAMES S. EUSTICE Er
AL., THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 2-31 to 2-62 (1987); McQUEEN & CRESTOL, supra
note 46, at S-40 to S-58.
50. See supra note 30 (noting Professor LoPucki's observations concerning early Missou-
ri Chapter 11 cases).
51. This occurs on motions to lift the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. section 362(d)
(1988), motions to convert to a Chapter 7 proceeding, or to dismiss a proceeding under 11
U.S.C. section 1112 (1988), and at confirmation of a reorganization plan under 11 U.S.C.
section 1129 (1988).
52. The Securities and Exchange Commission has explained the purposes of corporate
reorganizations as follows:
The reorganization of corporations is primarily an exercise in corporate
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is done through the issuance of new securities to the corporation's
creditors and shareholders and possibly to investors who provide addi-
tional capital for the reorganized corporation. As discussed above, the
need for reorganization grows out of two conditions. First, the
debtor's liabilities must be greater than the going concern value of its
assets and, second, the going concern value of its assets must exceed
its liquidation value.
The vanishing of the equity cushion leads to a crisis for the
corporation because it creates a conflict of interest between the
corporation's creditors and shareholders. The reorganization process
resolves this crisis by restoring the equity cushion so that the share-
holders in the reorganized corporation will have a stake in maximiz-
ing the corporation's value. Unless an adequate equity cushion is
restored, there is a substantial risk that the reorganized corporation
will again become insolvent, and that the conflict of interest between
the corporation's creditors and shareholders will reemerge. The future
is always uncertain, and an equity cushion ne*eds to be large enough
so that the reorganized corporation can absorb any fluctuations in its
earnings that can reasonably be anticipated. A corporation should not
be allowed to emerge from the reorganization process incapable of
withstanding some adversity. A bankruptcy court thus has an obliga-
tion to make certain that the reorganized corporation has a capital
structure with a sufficiently large equity cushion to protect the
corporation's existing and future creditors from a substantial risk of
future insolvency.53 The statutory basis for this obligation can be
finance and management. Only incidentally are reorganization proceedings law suits.
Reorganization involves all the problems of corporate finance and manage-
ment: it requires an inquiry into the causes of the financial collapse of the corpo-
ration; and into its worth if salvaged as going concern; and, if reorganization in-
stead of liquidation is determined upon, how this can best be accomplished upon a
basis not only fair but economically sound. The answers to these questions will
necessitate inquiry among other things into general economic factors, competitive
conditions in the industry, its trend of demand, and its price policies, as well as
inquiry into more immediate questions such as the quality of the debtor's manage-
ment. More narrowly, there will have to be inquiry into earnings in the past and
the prediction of future earnings, and chiefly on the latter basis, a determination of
what would constitute a sound capitalization and financial structure.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF
THE VORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES, Part VIII 1-2 (1940) [hereinafter SEC REPORT].
53. lt at Part VIII 160 (stating that "no aspect of a reorganization plan merits greater
consideration than its economic soundness. Sound capitalizations and financial structures are
the ultimate determinants of effective reorganizations.") (footnote omitted); E. Merrick Dodd
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found in the "feasibility requirement" in the Bankruptcy Code, which
requires, as a condition of confirmation of a reorganization plan, that
the plan "is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need
for further financial reorganization, of the debtor .... "5
Determining the appropriate level for the equity cushion in the
reorganized corporation is a matter for the judgment of the bankrupt-
cy court. An all-equity structure for the reorganized corporation would
provide the largest possible equity cushion, but this usually is not
necessary. Because the cost of debt is generally lower than the cost
of equity,5 5 the use of debt can provide a sensible amount of lever-
age to improve the reorganized corporation's earnings.56 The taking
on of debt increases risk, but most corporations manage with substan-
tial levels of debt.57 Furthermore, as long as the expected earnings
of the reorganized corporation are reasonably stable, the risk of a
subsequent insolvency can be reduced to a negligible level by main-
taining an adequate equity cushion. As noted previously,58  the size
of the equity cushion that a corporation needs depends on the volatili-
ty of its expected earnings. Because the volatility of earnings can be
expected to depend on the type of business in which a corporation is
engaged, it is not surprising that firms in the same industry typically
have similar capital structures.5 9 A bankruptcy court should therefore
Jr., Note, Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1100,
1102 (1935) (observing that "[t]he first essential of a workable reorganization plan is that it
shall, so far as is possible, provide the reorganized enterprise with a capital structure and
cash resources which will give it a reasonable chance of financial rebirth as a solvent going
concern.").
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
55. See supra notes 4-8, 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing the use of debt and
equity for capital financing); see also JACKSON, supra note 1, at 223 n.44 (stating that
"li]t . . . is by no means clear that imposing an all common capital structure on a
firm-even if subsequently recapitalized-has no costs.").
56. Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority Rule for
Corporate Reorganizations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1786, 1795 (1974) (observing that "a capital-
ization consisting solely of stock will seldom be proposed, [sic] because there are substantial
economic advantages to the inclusion of debt in the capital structure.") (footnote omitted). See
supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (observing that the use of debt for capital financing
improves the rate of return for shareholders).
57. See supra note 3 (noting that the debt-to-asset ratio dramatically increased for all
U.S. corporations between 1937 and 1979).
58. See supra note 15 (observing that in 821 corporations sampled, firm volatility is
significantly and negatively related to firm leverage ratios).
59. See Bradley et al., supra note 4, at 869 (stating that "almost 54% of the
cross-sectional variance in firm leverage ratios can be explained by industrial classification.
There is more variation in mean leverage ratios across industries than there is in firm lever-
age ratios within industries.") (footnote omitted).
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look at capital structures of other corporations in the same industry,
as well as at estimates of the reorganizing corporation's future earn-
ings, to determine an appropriate capital structure for the corpora-
tion.6°
There are essentially two ways to generate the equity cushion
needed to restore a sound capital structure to an insolvent corporation.
The most straightforward approach is to retire the interests of the
shareholders and the most junior of the creditors, and then to issue a
mix of stock and debt securities to the senior creditors.61 This is
illustrated in Figure 3. With the creditors of the formerly insolvent
corporation owning the stock that constitutes the residuary interest in
the reorganized corporation, there will be an equity cushion to assure
that the interests of shareholders and creditors coincide and are in line
with the goal of maximizing the reorganized corporation's value. One
potential drawback to this approach is that it can be expected that
many creditors will have a preference for holding debt rather than
equity and might not want to become owners of the reorganized cor-
poration.62 Those creditors that have especially strong preferences
60. IdM at 877 (concluding that "the strong finding of intra-industry similarities in firm
leverage ratios, and persistent inter-industry differences with the highly significant inverse
relation between firm leverage and earning volatility, tends to support the modem balancing
theory of optimal capital structure.").
61. POSNER, supra note 31, at 378. Judge Posner explains that:
[t]he company may have a viable future, short or long, which it can get to it [sic]
if it can just wipe out its current debt. One way of doing so is convert that debt
into equity capital, at which point the debt will cease being a fixed cost and thus
cease preventing the company from meeting its other expenses. A bankruptcy reor-
ganization does this.
Id; see also Note, Distress-Contingent Convertible Bonds: A Proposed Solution to the Excess
Debt Problem, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1857, 1870 (1991) (recommending that bondholders and
debtors contract for the automatic conversion of debt into equity when the equity value falls
below a specified threshold).
62. Professor LoPucki describes some of the practical problems that creditors might face
in assuming ownership as follows:
A creditors' committee is a clumsy device for seeking venture capital. The commit-
tee is without reasonable access to the business or adequate means of evaluating it
for purchase. Because purchase by the creditors would leave the owner-managers
with nothing, the unsecured creditors can expect no cooperation from them-and
perhaps a little treachery. The procedure for purchase probably is structured by the
debtor in such a way that the unsecured creditors must commit to pay a certain
price before confirmation and then accept the business in whatever condition the
(then) disgruntled debtor would leave it after confirmation. Even if the unsecured
creditors could overcome all of these obstacles, the business may not have much
value to them because they will not have the intimate knowledge of the business
or the business contacts and business relationships of the current
owner-managers-knowledge, contacts, and relationships which were acquired at the
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for debt can sell their shares and purchase debt interests in other
entities; however, this will normally entail some transaction costs,
such as brokers' commissions.63
Another approach is for an outside investor (or group of inves-
tors) to contribute capital for the equity cushion after the former stock
and debt in excess of the going concern value of the insolvent
corporation's assets have been retired. The outside investor would
then receive all the stock in the newly reorganized corporation. This
is illustrated in Figure 4. Having furnished capital that is now at risk,
the outside investor's interest would lie in maximizing the value of
the reorganized corporation and would thus coincide with the interests
of the creditors. An advantage that this approach offers is that, unlike
the former creditors of the insolvent corporation, the outside investor
is presumably interested in assuming a shareholder's role in the reor-
ganized corporation. This approach could also be combined with the
preceding approach by having some of the creditors furnish a part of
the equity cushion by "credit bidding" a portion of their debt, with
the outside investor contributing the remainder of what the bankruptcy
court determines that the reorganized corporation needs for an ade-
quate equity cushion.
Substantial costs are associated with either of these approaches.
The nature of these costs is examined briefly in the next section, and
then the reorganization process is compared to several alternatives that
have been suggested recently by commentators.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO REORGANIZATION
Although a corporate reorganization is one way to conserve a
surplus of going concern value over liquidation value in an insolvent
corporation, it may not necessarily be the best way. A corporate reor-
ganization is accomplished through an elaborate negotiation process
among representatives of the creditors, management, and shareholders
under the supervision of the bankruptcy court. It proceeds through the
filing of reorganization plans, which are sent to creditors and share-
holders for their approval, and which are ultimately submitted to the
bankruptcy court for confirmation. It is a cumbersome process that is
often slowed down by disputes over the valuation of the corporation's
assets. The determination of the going concern value of the
corporation's assets is generally a critical factor in this process."
63. See infra notes 64-119 and accompanying text (discussing transaction costs).
64. E.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 524 (1941) (explain-
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Usually, a high valuation favors shareholders and junior creditors,
while a low value favors senior creditors whose claims have priority
over others.6 5 Since determining going concern value "requires a pre-
diction as to what will occur in the future, an estimate, as distin-
guished from mathematical certitude, is all that can be made."' The
difficulty of determining going concern value is exacerbated by the
adversarial setting in which the claimants negotiate their claims and
interests in the reorganized corporation.67 When a corporation's lia-
bilities exceed its assets, shareholders have little or nothing to lose
from delay, since all the costs of delay will be borne by the creditors.
Both sides can be expected to try to exploit their bargaining positions
to gain more than that to which they are entitled. This may make the
negotiation process time consuming and expensive, and may also
produce an undesirable capital structure.
6 8
The reorganization process, therefore, entails substantial costs.
Pointing to these costs, several observers have questioned whether the
reorganization process is economically justifiable. They have also
proposed a number of alternatives that rely on the market to assist in
valuing the insolvent corporation's assets, and in allocating interests
in the reorganized corporation among its creditors and shareholders.6 9
These alternatives are analyzed below.
For several years, Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson have
advocated the liquidation of an insolvent corporation as a going con-
cern as an alternative to reorganization.7 ° They contend that selling
the insolvent corporation as a going concern would provide a market
65. See, e.g., J. Ronald Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of
Creditors or Stockholders?, 21 UCLA L. REv. 540, 545 (1973) (observing that "[t]he partici-
pation of junior creditor and shareholder interests depends upon a finding of value in the
business over and above that of the claims of the senior interests. This is where the battle is
fought between the stockholders and the creditors."); Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Absolute
Priority, and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 239, 244 (1977) (providing
a numerical example to show how the "overvaluation of the firm [can result] in a redistribu-
tion of the firm's assets to junior claimholders which would not have taken place if the
satisfaction of priorities were based upon the actual market value of the firm.").
66. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co., 312 U.S. at 526.
67. JACKSON, supra note 1, at 216.
68. See id at 215-17 (discussing the various costs associated with the negotiation
process); Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 780 (noting that the reorganization process often results
in an inefficient capital structure); Roe, supra note 1, at 536-45 (recognizing that the bank-
ruptcy bargaining process could result in inferior, high-debt capital structures).
69. See supra note 1 (noting the leading commentators' proposals of alternative schemes
for the reorganization process).
70. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 1, at 965-66; JACKSON, supra note 1, at 209-24;
Baird, supra note 1, at 127.
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pricing mechanism for determining going concern value in place of
the negotiation and adjudication mechanism of the reorganization
process. The market pricing mechanism would determine the
corporation's going concern value more accurately and would also
avoid the costs and delays of reorganization.
For similar reasons, Mark Roe and Lucian Bebehuk have sug-
gested other market-based alternatives to the present reorganization
process. Under Professor Roe's alternative,7 the reorganized corpora-
tion would have an all-equity capital structure, and a sale of ten per-
cent of its stock to the public would be used to establish its going
concern value. The remainder of the stock would be distributed to the
creditors in the order of priority of their claims, using the value from
the "slice-of-capital" to determine the number of shares of stock that
each creditor is entitled to receive.
Under Professor Bebchuk's alternative,72 various rights in the
reorganized corporation would be issued to the creditors and share-
holders of the insolvent corporation, which they could exercise within
a specified time. Whether they exercised these rights or let them
expire would depend on their valuation of the insolvent corporation's
assets as a going concern. Professor Bebchuk uses, as an initial exam-
ple, a corporation that has two types of creditors, junior and senior,
as well as shareholders, but he later generalizes his proposal to cover
an arbitrary number of ranked classes of shareholders and creditors.73
The shareholders would receive options to purchase the stock of the
reorganized corporation at a price based on the total amount of junior
and senior debt in the insolvent corporation. If they exercised the
options, all the claims of creditors would be satisfied, and the share-
holders would own the reorganized corporation. If the shareholders
failed to exercise the options, then the junior creditors would receive
options to purchase the stock of the reorganized corporation at a price
based on the amount of senior debt. If the junior creditors exercised
the options, the senior debt would be satisfied, but if the junior credi-
tors failed to exercise the options, the senior creditors would receive
all the stock in the reorganized corporation. The options issued to the
shareholders and junior creditors would be transferable and could be
traded on the market until their expiration date. Professor Bebchuk's
alternative relies on the shareholders and junior creditors (or the pur-
71. Roe, supra note 1, at 559.
72. Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 781-88.
73. Ma at 781-82, 800-01.
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chasers of the options in the market) to value the corporation as a
going concern. If the shareholders and junior creditors believe that the
value of the insolvent corporation is greater than the amount of senior
debt, they can purchase the corporation by exercising their options;
otherwise, their options will expire and ownership of the corporation
will go to the senior creditors.
Each of these alternatives avoids some of the disadvantages of
the reorganization process, but each also introduces costs that the
reorganization process avoids. These costs, which are analyzed below,
have been almost entirely ignored by the commentators who have
advocated these alternatives to reorganization.
A. The Baird and Jackson Alternative:
Liquidation as a Going Concern
The main advantage that reorganization has over liquidation as a
going concern is that reorganization avoids the transaction costs of
arranging financing for the purchase of the corporation as a going
concern. Carrying out a liquidation as a going concern would involve
raising the capital for the purchase of the insolvent corporation,
through either borrowing or stock sales, and then distributing this
capital to the creditors of the insolvent corporation.74 By reallocating
the shares of the corporate pie among the existing creditors and
shareholders, instead of paying off the claims of creditors, a reorgani-
zation avoids the costs of raising the capital necessary for purchasing
the corporation. Depending on the circumstances, the costs of raising
capital that are saved through reorganization may be greater than the
cost of the reorganization process.
This advantage to reorganization is shown by the context in
which the equity receivership, the forerunner of business reorganiza-
tions, arose. Equity receiverships developed out of the financial col-
lapse of many railroad corporations in the latter half of the nineteenth
century.75 Raising the capital for the formation of the railroads was
74. A liquidation as a going concern may be viewed as a special case of the reorgani-
zation process illustrated in Figure 4, in which new capital equal to the going concern value
of the corporation's assets is contributed and then distributed to the creditors in order of their
priority.
75. HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss
ENTERPRISES 828 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining that -[t]he equity receivership developed in the
federal courts to reorganize corporations, especially railroads, in financial difficulties, to permit
their continued operation and preserve their going concern value . . . . The whole proceeding
was court-developed and evidenced remarkable judicial ingenuity."); see also De Forest
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itself a colossal feat that required use of the modem corporate
form.76 When some of the railroads began to falter, the equity re-
ceivership was developed so that the vast railroad systems could be
preserved.'
The distinctive problem caused by a railroad's insolvency was
that it would have been very difficult or perhaps impossible to raise
the capital necessary to finance its purchase as a whole so that it
could be continued as a going concern.7" As the Supreme Court ob-
Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders in Bankruptcy Reorganization: New Directions, 67
HARV. L. REV. 553, 556 (1954) (noting that "[u]ntil long after 1900, the story of corporate
reorganization in America consisted chiefly of the story of railroad reorganization."); Stem,
supra note 40, at 783 (stating that "[c]orporate reorganization emerged out of the courts of
equity as part of the response to railroad insolvencies of the mid-nineteenth century."). The
earliest report of an equity receivership's being granted appears to be Collins v. Central
Bank, I Ga. 435 (1846), which arose out of a railroad insolvency. See Arthur H. Dean, A
Review of the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 537, 538 (1941).
76. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 12 (1932) (stating that "[r]ailroad construction, involving a heavy initial
outlay of capital, almost necessitated recourse to the corporate form. Once the first short lines
had been constructed, this form made possible the next step, consolidation into larger sys-
tems.").
77. Heuston, supra note 41, at 1199. Professor Alfred Heuston observed:
The federal equity receivership developed because of the necessity for continued
operation of railroad and public utility properties pending the adjustment of diffi-
culties with creditors. It spread to industrial corporations for a variety of reasons,
including the increasing difficulty of liquidating at advantageous prices industrial
properties which had been constructed for or adapted to specific purposes.
d; see also Stem, supra note 40, at 783 (explaining that when "[flaced with multitudes
descending to press their individual claims and threatening to dismember the functioning
[railroads], [the courts of equity] began to fashion a procedure that would satisfy the calls
both of equity and of the interested community. To this end, the venerable common-law
property remedies of receivership and foreclosure were pressed into service.").
78. Professor Blum described this problem as follows:
Large distressed corporations cannot be sold intact, and selling them piecemeal
changes the commodity by destroying whatever value arises because a concern is a
going thing and not a random collection of assets . . . . Our railroads, which
periodically have been in financial difficulties, are most frequently used to illustrate
the explanation. A troubled road, it is said, cannot be sold for more than a token
sum because it is too big to sell in one piece and too integrated to break up into
smaller units. The proof of its unsalability consists of pointing out why it would
be difficult to find a purchaser. From this muster a pair of observations or asser-
tions emerge: Rarely does any one person or private group have the wealth to
finance acquisition of a railroad, while a public sale through flotation of new secu-
rities is impractical inasmuch as individual investors are said to be averse to buy-
ing into a distressed road.
Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV.
565, 566-67 (1950) (footnotes omitted). Dean Clark offered the following explanation of the
development of the equity receivership:
The fourth phase of development occurred in the United States when the equity
1991]
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
served in an early case:
The enormous value of corporate property often makes it impossible
for one, or a score, or a hundred bondholders to purchase, and
equally so for stockholders to protect their interests. A combination
is necessary to secure a bidder and to prevent a sacrifice. Coopera-
tion being essential, there is no reason why the stockholders should
not unite with the bondholders to buy in the property.79
The equity receivership enabled an insolvent corporation's assets to be
sold to its existing creditors and shareholders without their having to
raise the capital for the purchase price. It was therefore analogous to
a mortgagee's credit bid at a foreclosure sale. ° Assuming that the
receivership evolved to the point where all or many of the creditors of the insol-
vent business debtor could themselves act as the buyers of the business-which
would be kept as a going concern, if that made sense-using not cash as the
means of payment, but their creditor claims, such as notes, bonds, debentures, or
the like, usually valued at face value plus accrued interest. The creditors could, in
effect, initiate a transformation of their debt holdings into stock, or into some
mixture of new debt and stock, and at the same time exercise their contractual
rights of priority among themselves and against the residual claimants (the old
shareholders) in a way that was just as definitive as a real liquidation sale to an
outside buyer. This procedure made economic sense whenever there were no or
few potential outside buyers with accurate and timely information about the true
state of affairs and the future prospects of the business, and when the process of
searching for and informing outside buyers would itself be very expensive.
Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1252
(1981) (footnotes omitted); see also Stem, supra note 40, at 798-99, stating that:
[t]he early failures of the market for insolvent railroads are easily understood. The
general unavailability of local venture capital and the size of the insolvent railroads
put such purchases beyond the reach of virtually all potential bidders other than
the debtholders themselves. Outside bidders thus appeared only occasionally, even
during the early years of the twentieth century when the national securities markets
were beginning to take shape.
M, (footnotes omitted).
79. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504 (1913); see also Kansas City Termi-
nal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926) (observing that it is practically
"impossible to sell the property of a great railroad for cash; and, generally, the interests of
all parties, including the public, are best served by cooperation between bondholders and
stockholders."). Similarly, the Securities Exchange Commission noted in the SEC REPORT: "Of
course, numerous other reasons may make for a decision to reorganize rather than liqui-
date . . . . [A] corporation may be so large that its sale would bring forth not merely
inadequate bids, but no bids at all. It is commonplace that a railroad cannot be sold like a
suburban acre." SEC REPORT, supra note 52, at Part VIII 7. Judge Frank expressed the same
point as follows: "$30,000,000 does not grow on bushes. It is almost impossible to ob-
tain-especially as it is usually impossible to induce any banking group to compete with
those in charge of the reorganization." Jerome Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some
Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, 19 VA. L. REV. 541, 554 (1933).
80. See James N. Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization, 17 COLUM. L. REV.
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receivership court would allow it, the lawyers could restructure an
insolvent corporation without having to enlist the aid of underwriters
and investment bankers.
Professor Baird and Dean Jackson recognize that there may have
been a need for the equity receivership in the late nineteenth century
because of the difficulty of raising capital then. However, they ques-
tion whether a need for the reorganization process still exists in
today's economy, where organized markets enable billions of dollars
to be raised from the public and where even some individuals, such
as Donald Trump, can acquire large companies for hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars.8 ' Costs are involved in running even an efficient
market, however, and in some circumstances these costs may be
greater than the costs of the reorganization process.
Determining the feasibility and cost of raising capital is an em-
pirical question that is complicated by the variety of sources of avail-
able capital. Loans from financial institutions are one source. Al-
though some loans may state figures for the transaction costs sepa-
rately from the interest rate, many do not and, so, determining the
transaction costs for loans is not feasible. Data on the costs of raising
capital for publicly held corporations may be obtained, however,
where a third party, such as an underwriter, is involved as an inter-
mediary between investors and issuers of securities.82
Since its establishment in 1933, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has conducted a number of studies of the costs of under-
writing debt and equity securities.8 3 These studies have generated a
523, 523-26 (1917) (describing the equity receivership process); Stem, supra note 40, at 798,
stating that:
[ilnstead of importing the less familiar, but more circumspect, device of the Eng-
lish chancery courts, the American courts of equity simply extended to railroad
foreclosures their standard solution to problems of insufficient competition at auc-
tions. Thus, they began in the latter part of the nineteenth century to write decrees
of foreclosure that, as a matter of course, authorized mortgagees to bid at foreclo-
sure.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
81. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 1, at 965-66.
82. For an excellent discussion of the underwriting process, see 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 315-80 (3d ed. 1990).
83. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COST OF FLOTATION OF REGISTERED
ISSUES 1971-1972 (1974) [hereinafter COST OF FLOTATION 1971-1972]; SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE CoMMISSIoN, COST OF FLOTATION OF REGISTERED EQUITY IssUES 1963-1965
(1970) [hereinafter COST OF FLOTATION 1963-1965]; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
COST OF FLOTATION OF REGISTERED ISSUES 1951-1955 (1957) [hereinafter COST OF FLOTA-
7ION 1951-1955]; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PRIVATELY-PLACED SECURITIES-
-COST OF FLOTATION (1952) [hereinafter PRIVATELY-PLACED SECURITIES]; SECURITIES AND
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large amount of data that show many factors that affect underwriting
costs, and also great variations in underwriting costs between offer-
ings. One important variable is the nature of the security-common
stock, preferred stock, or bond. The most recent SEC study, which
covers registered issues in 1971 and 1972, showed an average "cost
of flotation" as a percentage of gross proceeds of 12.43% for com-
mon stock, 1.91% for preferred stock, and 1.59% for debt. 4 Signifi-
cant economies of scale were observed; for example, the cost of
flotation for common stock as a percentage of gross proceeds ranged
from 23.59% for issues of less than $500,000 down to 3.19% for
issues between 100 million and 500 million dollars. 85 Another factor
that appeared to have a substantial effect on the cost of flotation was
the risk differential between offerings; 6 this factor was difficult to
quantify and measure.8 7 Finally, the cost of flotation was affected by
the method of underwriting used (firm commitment or best efforts); 88
whether the offering was primary or secondary; 9 and whether the
issue was offered to the general public, either through security dealers
or directly, or only to existing security holders, either through security
dealers or directly.' The results of the 1971-1972 study are in gen-
eral agreement with the findings of previous SEC cost-of-flotation studies.9
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COST OF FLOTATION 1945-1949 (1951) [hereinafter COST OF FLOTA-
TION 1945-1949]; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COST OF FLOTATION FOR REGIS-
TERED SECURITIES, 1938-1939 (1941) [hereinafter COST OF FLOTATION 1938-1939]; SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, COST OF FLOTATION FOR SMALL ISSUES, 1925-1929 AND
1935-1938 (1940) [hereinafter COST OF FLOTATION FOR SMALL ISSUES].
84. COST OF FLOTATION 1971-1972, supra note 83, at 9, 24, 29.
85. rd. at 9.
86. Id. at 6 (stating that "it has often been observed that rates of compensation differ
substantially for issues with approximately the same magnitude of gross proceeds. This
phenomenon may be attributable to the risks associated with both the underwriting and
distribution of issues of differing quality.").
87. Id. at 6-7.
88. With firm commitment underwriting, the underwriter purchases the entire issue and
then resells it to the public; the underwriter therefore bears the risk that the securities will
not sell for their expected price. In contrast, with best efforts underwriting, the underwriter
sells the securities as the issuer's agent and the issuer bears the risk that they will not sell
for their expected price. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 82, at 341-42.
89. Primary offerings are sales of securities by the issuer with the issuer receiving the
proceeds, while secondary offerings are sales of securities by shareholders or bondholders.
COST OF FLOTATION 1971-1972, supra note 83, at 16.
90. Id. at 14-24.
91. Id. at 8. For example, the 1945-1949 study found that the average cost of flotation
as a percentage of gross proceeds was 9.61% for common stock, 4.21% for preferred stock,
and 1.30% for debt. COST OF FLOTATION 1945-1949, supra note 83, at 5; see also LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 82, at 337, stating that:
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This empirical data indicate that, depending on the amount of
capital raised, the type of security, and the means of distribution, the
costs of raising capital may be substantial. 92 An especially significant
finding of the 1971-1972 SEC study was that underwriting costs are
higher for riskier securities.93 Investing in insolvent corporations is
widely perceived to be, and undoubtedly is, riskier than investing in
solvent corporations. 94 Accordingly, it is likely that the costs of rais-
ing capital for the purpose of financing the liquidation of an insolvent
corporation as a going concern would be substantially larger than the
underwriting costs for the solvent corporations that were analyzed in
the SEC studies.
One cannot say from the SEC data what the costs of raising
capital would be for any particular insolvent corporation, or whether
it would be greater than the costs incurred during the course of a
reorganization process. Nevertheless, the SEC studies do suggest that,
for many insolvent corporations, the costs of raising the capital to
liquidate a corporation as a going concern are greater than the costs
of reorganization. It is therefore important for bankruptcy judges and
attorneys to be aware of the tradeoffs between liquidation and reorga-
nization. In many cases, they might even want to obtain information
from underwriters about the costs of raising capital to liquidate an
insolvent corporation as a going concern. If the liquidation costs are
[t]he difference between the price at which members of the public buy an
underwritten security and the amount received by the issuer is known as the "gross
spread." The spread may range in size from a fraction of 1 percent to 10 percent
or more. Typically, initial public offers will have spreads of 7 to 10 percent.
Id. (footnote omitted).
92. See MASULIS, supra note 25, at 6 (stating that "[t]he flotation costs associated with
security offerings to the public represent a significant fraction of gross proceeds from the
sales.").
93. See COST OF FLOTATION 1971-1972, supra note 83, at 6-14; see also MAsulUS,
supra note 25, at 6-7 (stating that "[m]ore interesting is the SEC finding that flotation costs
of nonconvertible debt issues rise with a drop in debt rating class, even after taking into
account issue size. This evidence taken as a whole suggests that riskier securities have higher
proportional flotation costs."); Robert Hansen, Evaluating the Costs of a New Equity Issue, 4
MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 42, 51-52 (1986) (explaining that "It]he empirical evidence indicates
that there are indeed risk premiums contained in the underwriting spread. In general, the
greater the historical volatility of the issuing company's stock price, the larger the underwrit-
ing spread."). The Hansen article also sets out an equation for approximate calculations of
flotation costs that has these costs rising proportionally with the riskiness of the offering. I.
at 55.
94. See Warner, supra note 65, at 240 (empirical data showed that the risk associated
with a sample of bonds of railroads in bankruptcy was approximatedly equal to the risk of
the market index of stocks).
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lower than the expected costs of the reorganization process, then
liquidation should be ordered. Indeed, it would appear that liquidation
would be required under the Bankruptcy Code's "best interests of
creditors"95 test in these circumstances.96
Reorganization is certainly not appropriate for every insolvent
corporation, but there is good reason to believe that it is appropriate
for some. What makes the difference is the magnitude of transaction
costs. 97 Just as the transaction costs that are incurred in bringing
assets together may contribute added value to the asset side of the
balance sheet, the transaction costs that are incurred in raising the
capital necessary to bring the assets together may contribute added
value to the liability side of the balance sheet. Even though a corpo-
ration is insolvent, the added value locked inside its aggregation of
assets may make piecemeal liquidation uneconomical. Likewise, the
added value locked inside its capital structure may make liquidation
as a going concern uneconomical. The justification for the reorganiza-
tion process is that it salvages part of the existing capital structure,
rather than wiping it out entirely and necessitating starting from
scratch. The reorganization process thereby avoids some of the costs
of refinancing the entire corporation.98 The presence of transaction
costs also hampers the alternatives to reorganization suggested by
Professors Roe and Bebchuk, which are discussed below.
B. The Roe Alternative: The Slice of Capital Sale
Professor Roe's alternative employs the market to determine the
going concern value of an insolvent corporation's assets. 9 He sug-
95. This requirement is found in 11 U.S.C. section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1988), which
provides that a bankruptcy court may confirm a plan of reorganization only if each holder of
a claim "will receive or retain under the plan . . . property of a value . . . that is not less
than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated
under chapter 7 of this title. ... *
96. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE LJ. 857, 893 (1982) (noting that "it would seem that a proper-
ly conceived-of Chapter 7 proceeding would require the entity to be sold (i.e., liquidated) as
a unit rather than piecemeal whenever its going concern value exceeds its piecemeal liquida-
tion value.") (footnote omitted).
97. Cf JACKSON, supra note 1, at 220 n.35 (noting that "[i]nvestment bankers, for
example, are not inexpensive in mergers or public offerings and are likely to be expensive in
bankruptcy proceedings as well. Yet they are used in consensual deals; the question is their
cost relative to the costs of the current bankruptcy process.") (emphasis in original).
98. Cf. Baird, supra note 1, at 139 (noting that "[t]he justification for a reorganization
must focus on showing the higher costs of selling the firm to a third party.").
99. Roe, supra note 1, at 559.
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gests that a bankruptcy court should have an underwriter conduct a
public sale of a slice of capital (say, ten percent of the total
stock)" ° of the reorganizing corporation. Then the court could use
the selling price to value the total assets and distribute the remaining
shares of stock to the creditors in order of their priority. The advan-
tages that Professor Roe sees in this alternative to reorganization are
the following: (1) it avoids the costs and delays of negotiation and
adjudication; and (2) the market's valuation of the corporation's assets
is likely to be more accurate than that of the bankruptcy court. °1
However, in evaluating Professor Roe's alternative, the transaction
costs that a public sale of a slice of capital would entail have to be
weighed against the costs and delays of negotiation and adjudication.
Although the costs of floating only a slice of capital would be less
than those for floating all the corporation's stock,"°2 there surely
ought to be a cheaper way for a bankruptcy court to obtain a reason-
ably accurate appraisal of the corporation's assets than by actually
carrying out a public sale of even a portion of its stock. In the under-
writing process itself the underwriters must appraise the securities in
order to determine the terms of the underwriting agreement, including
the price to be paid to the issuer.0 3 Thus, a bankruptcy court could
determine the going concern value of an insolvent corporation's assets
by requesting bids from several underwriters.
Professor Roe's second concern is that the bankruptcy court
might not value the insolvent corporation's assets as accurately as the
market would. He contends that if the reorganization plan calls for a
substantial amount of debt, an incorrect valuation may cause the
reorganized corporation to have an unsound capital structure, which
may lead to a second insolvency."° However, neither the market's
100. Id at 577.
101. Id at 599. Professor Roe states:
Such an approach would slash through the tangled bankruptcy knots of valuation,
distributional conflicts, and recapitalization. The wisdom of replacing the current
means of valuation in bankruptcy with this market-based approach is initially de-
pendent on the relative accuracy, speed, and cost of market valuation when com-
pared to the current mechanisms.
Id. at 559.
102. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text. The SEC cost of flotation studies
show economies of scale that bring underwriting costs as a percentage of gross proceeds
down as the size of the offering increases, but the total underwriting costs increase with the
size of the offering.
103. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 82, at 331-37.
104. Professor Roe expresses this point as follows:
[B]ecause of a lack of judicial expertise, a potential need to rely on the parties,
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nor the bankruptcy court's valuation of the insolvent corporation's
assets will necessarily be accurate in the sense of exactly matching
the reorganized corporation's actual future earnings. If the level of
debt in the reorganized corporation is excessive, there is a risk of
future insolvency whether the market or the bankruptcy court places
an incorrect valuation on the insolvent corporation's assets. Fortunate-
ly, the valuation need not be exact to protect against the risk of fu-
ture insolvency as long as the reorganized corporation has an ade-
quate equity cushion. However, this is not to say that the valuation of
the insolvent corporation's assets as a going concern is unimportant.
As is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, the valuation may determine
whether particular claims of creditors are discharged or are provided
for in the reorganization plan so that they will be satisfied eventually
by the reorganized corporation. Although accurate valuation is impor-
tant, Professor Roe's method is probably less cost effective than other
methods, such as the bankruptcy court's analyzing bids from under-
writers or conducting a valuation hearing.
Once a going concern valuation is obtained, Professor Roe's
alternative calls for distribution of the stock of the reorganized corpo-
ration that remains after the slice of capital sale to the insolvent
and the ease with which bankruptcy litigation problems can be resolved by using
complex capital structures, there is a substantial basis for concluding that action in
the reorganization court seems unlikely to lead to a capital structure as sound as
those ordinarily derived from marketplace bargains. More important, the reorganiza-
tion court seems unlikely to lead to quick resolution of the problem of reapitaliza-
tion.
Roe, supra note 1, at 548; see also id. at 600-02. Dean Jackson has a similar criticism:
[Tihere is likely to be a cost to valuations by a bankruptcy judge that is not pres-
ent in marketplace valuations. Substantial evidence suggests that valuations by
bankruptcy judges are systematically too high. Most firms that reorganize fail short-
ly thereafter, notwithstanding the fact that a bankruptcy judge has made a finding
of "feasibility." There is no good reason to believe that bankruptcy judges are
particularly good valuators. And there are, moreover, some reasons to think that
even good-intentioned bankruptcy judges may be overly optimistic about a firm's
chances of success-and hence its value. Cognitive processing errors may lead
judges, like most individuals, to underestimate risks and to overestimate chances of
success. Few corrective constraints on such cognitive biases exist. Whereas market
participants lose money when they make an incorrect decision, no similar conse-
quence befalls a bankruptcy judge. Nor are there likely to be effective constraints
analogous to the discipline a market imposes on buyers who make systematic er-
rors.
JACKSON, supra note 1, at 220-21 (footnotes omitted); see also Warner, supra note 65, at
244 (observing that "[t]here is, in fact, evidence that overvaluation in corporate reorganiza-
tions has been more frequent than 'undervaluation,* and has resulted in substantial deviations
from the usual textbook notion of priority.") (footnote omitted).
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corporation's former creditors in order of their priority. The most
senior claims would be converted to stock in the reorganized corpora-
tion based on the price obtained at the slice of capital sale, while
junior claims would be discharged and the insolvent corporation's
stock would be canceled. This aspect of Professor Roe's alternative is
a variation of the conversion of debt to equity method of reorganiza-
tion illustrated in Figure 3105 This method of reorganization has the
advantage of avoiding many of the transaction costs entailed in liqui-
dating an insolvent corporation as a going concern. Its disadvantage,
however, is that many creditors might prefer to hold debt in the reor-
ganized corporation instead of stock, particularly since they had been
creditors of the corporation before the insolvency. Of course, the
creditors could sell their shares to other investors who want to be
shareholders (such as former shareholders of the insolvent corpora-
tion), and purchase debt in another corporation. But this would entail
transaction costs in the form of brokerage commissions. These trans-
action costs could be avoided through the Chapter 11 reorganization
process described in the preceding section of this Article by permit-
ting the other investors to contribute new capital to the reorganizing
corporation in exchange for stock.
Professor Roe also would require the reorganized corporation to
have an all equity (or nearly all equity)"° capital structure in order
to eliminate the possibility of a future insolvency. °7 Debt is usually
a cheaper source of financing than equity, however, and accordingly,
insisting on an all-equity capital structure seems ill-advised."0 8 As
long as debt is kept at an acceptably low level through the mainte-
nance of an adequate equity cushion, the risk of future insolvency can
be minimized.
In summary, Professor Roe's alternative has several disadvantages
compared to the traditional Chapter 11 reorganization process. The
sale of a slice of capital to determine a corporation's going concern
105. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
106. Roe, supra note 1, at 595 (observing that "de minimis debt levels might be al-
lowed.").
107. Id at 600 (explaining that "[t]here seems little to undermine the view that were a
bankruptcy court most interested in maximizing the post-reorganization viability of the bank-
rupt, it would seek all-common-stock recapitalization.-).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8, and references cited in notes 15-18 (sup-
porting the view that debt financing by a firm is generally preferred over equity, although the
issue continues to be a widely debated one in financial theory); see also JACKSON, supra
note 1, at 223 n.44 (explaining that -[i]t ... is by no means clear that imposing an all
common capital structure on a firm-even if subsequently recapitalized-has no costs.").
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value would entail transaction costs that may make it more expensive
than the taking of testimony at a valuation hearing. The insolvent
corporation's creditors might not want to exchange their debt claims
for shares of stock in the reorganized corporation, as Professor Roe's
alternative would require them to do. Finally, an all-equity capital
structure may not be the best choice for the reorganized corporation.
Nevertheless, Professor Roe's alternative would be an'appropriate
method of reorganization provided that: the former creditors were
satisfied with receiving stock instead of debt in the reorganized cor-
poration; they wanted the corporation to have an all-equity capital
structure; and the former shareholders did not want to contribute new
capital to the reorganizing corporation.
C. The Bebchuk Alternative: Issuance of Options
Professor Bebchuk's alternative involves issuing options to share-
holders and junior creditors to purchase stock in the insolvent corpo-
ration for the amount of the senior debt. This alternative is essentially
a variation of liquidation as a going concern. The exercise of the
options would wipe out the existing capital structure and replace it
with an all-equity capital structure. Accordingly, the exercise of the
options would involve the same sorts of transaction costs that liquida-
tion as a going concern would.'
For the shareholders to exercise their options, they would collec-
tively have to raise an amount of capital equal to the total debt of
the insolvent corporation. If, as is likely, the shareholders decided that
the going concern value of the insolvent corporation was less than the
total debt, they would not exercise their options, and the junior credi-
tors would be given the opportunity to exercise theirs.' For the
junior creditors to exercise their options, they would collectively have
to raise an amount of capital equal to the total amount of senior debt.
109. Bebchuk, supra note 1, at 775. Professor Bebchuk notes a possible objection to his
proposal that some shareholders or junior creditors might be reluctant or lack enough wealth
to invest in the reorganized corporation. He responds to this objection by observing that the
amounts needed would generally be small relative to the wealth of the investors, and that if
they did have a liquidity problem, the investors could borrow the necessary money. He does
not address the transaction costs that would be entailed in raising the capital for the exercise
of the options. Id. at 796-97.
110. Presumably, reorganization would not be necessary if the going concern value of the
corporation exceeded its total debt, since there would be a positive equity against which the
corporation could borrow in order to pay debts as they became due. See supra Figure 1 and
notes 19-20 and accompanying text (explaining generally that a positive equity account is
necessary for a corporation to have access to credit).
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They could be expected to do so only if they believed that the
amount of senior debt was less than the going concern value of the
corporation's assets. Since the junior creditors would not need any
capital to satisfy their own claims, the amount of capital that they
would have to raise to exercise their options could much be less than
the going concern value of the corporation's assets, which is what
would be required if the corporation were liquidated as a going con-
cern. Depending on the amount of senior debt, however, the amount
of capital necessary could be quite large and, thus, the transaction
costs that would be involved could be substantial.
Assuming that either the shareholders or the junior creditors
exercised their options, the primary distinction between Professor
Bebchuk's alternative and liquidation as a going concern is the source
of the capital used to purchase the assets of the insolvent corporation.
Under Professor Bebchuk's alternative, the capital would come from
existing shareholders or junior creditors of the insolvent corporation,
while, for liquidation as a going concern, the capital would come
from a third party or from the public at large. Consequently, Profes-
sor Bebchuk's alternative resembles a direct rights offering (in which
capital is raised by distributing options to purchase stock to existing
shareholders)"' as opposed to an underwritten public offering.
One would not expect transaction costs for direct offerings to be
significantly lower than for underwritten public offerings, but empiri-
cal data from the SEC studies, as well as from other sources, shows
transaction costs for direct offerings to be approximately half of those
111. See Clifford W. Smith Jr., Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process,
15 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 15 (1986) (stating that -[i]n a rights offering, each stockholder receives
options to buy newly issued securities. One right is issued for each share held."). Professor
Hansen describes a direct rights offering as follows:
[T]he direct rights offering . . . is distinguished by the fact that the corporation is
offering the new common stock directly to and through its current stockholders.
Initially, each owner is given a subscription -right" (which is created by splitting
each old share into another share and one right) to purchase a pro rata amount of
the new common stock from the company at a fixed subscription price. This sub-
scription right is thus a valuable call option on the newly issued shares, although
the option is typically short-lived, lasting only the typical two- or three-week sub-
scription period. During this subscription period, new shares are sold through the
exercise of subscription rights. The subscriber pays the corporation the subscription
price for each subscribed share and simultaneously cashes in the appropriate num-
ber of subscription rights.
Robert Hansen, Evaluating the Costs of a New Equity Issue, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 42,
43 (1986); see also COST OF FLOTATION 1971-1972, supra note 83, at 80 (stating that
"frights offerings refer to corporate offerings to existing shareholders prior to a public
distribution.") (emphasis in original).
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for underwritten public offerings.12 Thus, it could be that the trans-
action costs for Professor Bebchuk's alternative would be substantially
lower than the costs of liquidation as a going concern. On the other
hand, it is probable that direct offerings would not be feasible in the
business reorganization context. Despite their lower costs, direct offer-
ings are much less common than underwritten public offerings," 3
and this has puzzled financial economists for some time." 4 The pre-
vailing explanation for the lower costs of direct rights offerings ap-
pears to be that underwriters perform a monitoring or certification
function, in addition to their marketing function, when securities are
sold to the general public in an underwritten offering."15 Although
112. COST OF FLOTATION 1971-1972, supra note 83, at 20-21 (positing that total costs of
flotation as a percentage of gross proceeds were 6.72% for rights offerings, as compared to
12.43% for offerings to the general public); Smith, supra note 111, at 15 (stating that "the
out-of-pocket expenses of an equity issue underwritten by an investment banker are from
three to thirty times higher than the costs of a non-underwritten rights offering."); Clifford W.
Smith, Alternative Methods for Raising Capital: Rights Versus Underwritten Offerings, 5 J.
FIN. EcON. 273, 277 (1977) (noting that costs of flotation as a percentage of gross proceeds
were 2.45% for rights offerings as compared to 6.17% for offerings to the general public);
see also Hansen, supra note 111, at 45 (presenting a chart comparing flotation costs as a
percentage of gross proceeds for rights offerings and offerings to the general public); Robert
S. Hansen & John M. Pinkerton, Direct Equity Financing: A Resolution of a Paradox, 37 J.
FIN. 651, 653 (1982) (stating that "in periodic Securities and Exchange Commission stud-
ies . . . reported costs as a percentage of issue size for [rights] offerings generally run 4-10
percent less than corresponding costs for fully underwritten public offerings.").
113. Hansen & Pinkerton, supra note 112, at 651 (noting that "periodic Securities and
Exchange Commission studies . . . generally report that less than 5 percent of all new
common stock is offered nonunderwritten to current owners.").
114. See Id. at 651, which opens with the following statement of the problem:
One of the unresolved issues confronting financial economists is the following
equity financing paradox. Historically, U.S. firms have overwhelmingly elected to
employ investment bankers to underwrite and publicly distribute their new equity
offerings. Yet the reported flotation costs as a percent of issue size have been
substantially less for nonunderwritten privileged subscription (direct) offers.
lad
115. See James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the
Certification Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261, 280 (1986) (stating that "[t]his paper advances
the 'certification hypothesis' to explain the role of the underwriter in the capital raising
process. Due to potential opportunistic behavior by insiders, underwriters can be employed to
certify that issue price is consistent with inside information."); James R. Booth & Richard L.
Smith, The Certification Role of the Investment Banker in New Issue Pricing, 4 MIDLAND
CORP. FIN. J. 56, 56 (1986) stating that:
[t]his article provides a rationale for the preference of apparently more
expensive security issuance methods and identifies a function of the underwriter not
recognized in the traditional literature on investment banking. We argue that a firm
seeking to raise new capital can employ an underwriter to "certify" that the issue
price is consistent with inside information.
Id; Smith, supra note 112, at 296 (noting that "[t]he one hypothesis I find which is consis-
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investors require underwriters to perform this monitoring or certifica-
tion function for most offerings, some issuers may be so substantial
that investors are willing to forego this underwriting function so that
the issuers can take advantage of the lower costs of direct offer-
ings."6 This explanation is supported by the observations that direct
offerings tend to be larger than underwritten offerings and that, gener-
ally, they are attempted only by larger, well-established companies
(often utilities) with broad public ownership of their securities."' In
addition, it seems that a direct offering is usually accompanied by a
guarantee from a corporate parent or large shareholder that ninety
percent of the desired gross proceeds will be obtained."'
Obviously, insolvent corporations lack the characteristics of issu-
ers that typically use direct offerings and, therefore, making direct
offerings of shares in corporations undergoing reorganization probably
would not work very well. Without underwriters performing their
certification function, the direct offering to the junior creditors might
fail even though the going concern value of the corporation's assets
was greater than the amount of senior debt.
Another problem with Professor Bebchuk's alternative is that the
tent with the available evidence relates to the costs of monitoring management. Although
direct expenses imposed on shareholders are higher per dollar raised through the use of
underwriters, I hypothesize that management derives benefits from their use."); Smith, supra
note 111, at 16 (observing that "in addition to a marketing function, the investment banker
performs a monitoring function analogous to that of bond rating agencies, of independent
auditing firms, of outside members of a firm's board of directors, and of insurance compa-
nies.") (footnotes omitted).
116. See Hansen, supra note 111, at 47, noting that:
because users of the direct rights method essentially had their guarantee of pro-
ceeds, and their purchasers were evidently satisfied with the quality of the new
shares, there were no potential investors which required certification of the value of
the shares, nor did issuers require the marketing services of a syndicate.
Id; see also Hansen & Pinkerton, supra note 112, at 651 stating that:
[tin the case of low-risk bond issues and of equity issues by companies that are
large, well-diversified, frequent issuers, the value of certification is relatively less
than in the case of riskier issues. Such issuers of low-risk securities are more
likely to benefit from the cost savings from using methods which provide less
certification. For such companies, net issue proceeds may be increased by relying
on best efforts underwriting, competitive bid auctions, shelf registrations, and even
perhaps direct rights offerings.
Id
117. COST OF FLOTATION 1971-1972, supra note 83, at 20.
118. Hansen, supra note 111, at i6; see also Hansen & Pinkerton, supra note 112, at
651 (explaining the lower costs of direct offerings by demonstrating empirically that firms
that use them enjoy a comparative cost advantage over other firms); Smith, supra note 112,
at 297 (employing monitoring cost hypothesis to explain lower costs of direct offerings).
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junior creditors might decide not to exercise their options simply
because they are not interested in an ownership role in the reorga-
nized corporation." 9 Professor Bebchuk contemplates that the op-
tions would be transferable, and so third parties interested in owning
the corporation, as well as former shareholders, could purchase them
from junior creditors who did not want to exercise them. But, of
course, transfers of options would entail additional transaction costs,
which would impede their exercise.
The absence of underwriters performing their certification func-
tion, the possibility that the junior creditors would not be interested in
an ownership role, and the presence of transaction costs may combine
to make the direct offering to the junior creditors fail. If the direct
offering failed because the options were not exercised, ownership of
the corporation would pass to the senior creditors. As a result, the
senior creditors might acquire ownership of the corporation even
though its going concern value was larger than the senior debt. To
this extent, Professor Bebchuk's alternative is tilted in favor of the
senior creditors.
Once the senior creditors succeeded to ownership of the insolvent
corporation's assets, their claims against the corporation, as well as
those of the junior creditors and shareholders, would be discharged.
The senior creditors would then be left with the choice of either
operating the former corporation's business themselves or (assuming
that its going concern value exceeded its liquidation value) liquidating
it as a going concern. No capital would have to be raised if the se-
nior creditors took over the business themselves; but, of course, liqui-
dating the corporation as a going concern would entail the transaction
costs discussed previously.
Professor Bebchuk's alternative would reach a fair result, and
would be cost effective, if the corporation's going concern value was
lower than the senior debt, and the senior creditors wanted to operate
the former corporation's business themselves. Neither the shareholders
nor the junior creditors would exercise their options, and the corpora-
tion would go to the senior creditors, who would take over its opera-
tion. The corporation's assets would wind up with the persons having
the highest priority claims to them, and no transaction costs would be
incurred to raise capital for their purchase. However, the same end
could be achieved by allowing the senior creditors to make a credit
119. Cf supra note 62 (providing Professor LoPucki's comments).
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bid at a liquidation sale, in which case reorganization would be un-
necessary.
This discussion has shown that the alternatives put forward by
the commentators in the past few years might well be less cost effec-
tive than the reorganization process for a number of insolvent corpo-
rations. Restructuring an insolvent corporation's capital structure in
the adversarial setting of a bankruptcy court has significant costs,
which have been identified by the commentators. What has not been
recognized is that the reorganization process also has the significant
advantage of minimizing the costs of raising capital. Having the bank-
ruptcy court decree what the going concern value of the insolvent
corporation's assets is, what the capital structure of the reorganized
corporation will be, and which claims of creditors will be discharged
and which will be provided for in the reorganization plan, saves the
transaction costs of raising the capital that would otherwise be re-
quired for liquidating the insolvent corporation as a going concern.
Whether the reorganization process is justified in a particular case
must be determined by weighing its costs against those of its alterna-
tives.
VII. CONCLUSION
The scheme of corporate governance depends on the maintenance
of an adequate equity cushion. In addition to providing security for a
corporation's creditors, an equity cushion ensures that shareholders
have a sufficient stake in the enterprise so that their interests are in
maximizing the corporation's value. The disappearance of the equity
cushion produces a crisis in corporate governance because it brings
the interests of the corporation's creditors and its shareholders and
management into conflict, and it gives all of them incentives to pur-
sue objectives other than that of maximizing the corporation's value.
The disappearance of the equity cushion is what gives rise to the
need for reorganization and, accordingly, the restoration of the equity
cushion should be the central objective of the reorganization process.
Although an equity cushion may be restored by converting some of
the insolvent corporation's debt to equity, so that some of the former
creditors become the shareholders of the reorganized corporation, in
many cases an infusion of new capital is required. The former share-
holders are often the most ready source of new capital, and their
contributions should be welcomed as long as the new capital is suffi-
cient to restore an adequate equity cushion. The size of the equity
cushion that is needed will vary from industry to industry, as well as
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from company to company, but it should be large enough to with-
stand losses from any difficulties that one can reasonably anticipate
that the reorganized corporation will encounter.
The key advantage to the reorganization process that is described
above is that it minimizes the amount of capital that must be raised
to restore the equity cushion. Instead of scrapping the corporation's
existing capital structure entirely (as would happen with its liquidation
as a going concern), the reorganization process leaves most of the
existing capital structure in place and concentrates on raising the
capital necessary to restore the equity cushion. Although the reorgani-
zation process is quite complicated and often contentious, it is proba-
bly warranted in many cases because it economizes on the costs of
raising the capital that the corporation needs in order to continue. In
any particular Chapter 11 proceeding, bankruptcy attorneys and judges
need to evaluate the tradeoffs between reorganization and its alterna-
tives.
